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[Cross-posted on the parent blog]
So as I said earlier,
I've been getting involved in a whole bunch of debates involving value
theory, and I wanted to sketch out a few of my views in order to have a
starting point for discussion, so I don't have to keep explaining
myself over and over again. In this post, I want to address the idea
that because there is no way to objectively measure utility, it is
impossible to coherently make claims which involve comparisons of
utility between people.
But before addressing this point, I
anticipate that it will be necessary to offer something by way of
disclaimer. It occurs to me that by suggesting that something can be
more valuable to one person than to another person, I will be accused
of being a Utilitarian--of claiming that the person to whom the thing
would be most valuable should be the one to have it. An example of a
view like this can be found in Peter Singer's famous essay, "Famine,
Affluence, and Morality," where he wrote:
When we
buy new clothes not to keep warm but to look "well-dressed" we are not
providing for any important need. We would not be sacrificing anything
if we were to continue to wear our old clothes, and give the money to
famine relief. By doing so, we would be preventing another person from
starving...we ought to give money away, rather than spend it on clothes
which we do not need to keep us warm. To do so is not charitable, or
generous. Nor is it the kind of act which it would be good to do, but
not wrong not to do. On the contrary, we ought to give the money away,
and it is wrong not to do so.
I do not wish to comment
on exactly to what extent I disagree with Singer, except to say that I
think that for very many people, maintaining a good appearance is a
very serious interest, and should not be brushed off with such little
care. I will also say, in passing, that I find slightly disturbing
Singer's view that morality requires us
to give to others "...unless in doing so we would be sacrificing
something of comparable moral significance..." I simply can not assent
to the idea that we have no right to indulge in pleasures of our own
(even if we've earned those pleasures!), as long as there are others
who are worse off than we are. The source of this objection is
obviously Kantian: my life is an end in itself, and I need not justify
my pursuit of personal fulfillment by reference to anything else but
the notion that I am an individual with a right to live my life
according to my own desires. I do, however, find plausible the idea
that we have some obligation to help those in need, and that neglect of
this duty is immoral (though perhaps, as Nozick pointed out, we would
not be justified in enforcing morality in this sense). But all of this
is beyond my point.
The purpose of this discussion is not to
explain the ethical consequences of interpersonal comparisons of
utility. It is simply meant to give some reason for thinking that we
are not necessarily incoherent to make claims which rely on comparisons
of utility between people. Accordingly, my disclaimer is this: My
argument is positive, and not normative. In saying that interpersonal
utility comparisons are, in at least some cases, possible, I am not
saying anything about what ought to
be done in cases where these comparisons show that one person would
benefit more than another from some policy, or where one person would
gain more than another would lose.
So with that protracted
disclaimer out of the way, I'll get on to the issue at hand. Perhaps
the most famous reason for thinking that utility can't be compared between individuals is discussed by R.F. Harrod in his essay, "Scope and Method of Economics." He writes:
Whether the nth unit of X has greater or less utility than the mth unit of Y
to a given individual may be made the subject of test. He can be given
the choice. But there are no scientific means of deciding whether the nth of X has greater or less utility to individual P than the mth of Y has to another individual Q. The choice can never be put.
This
point is entirely true. But notice what Harrod says next: "This implies
that we cannot in fact decide whether two pense have more utility to a
millionaire or a beggar. Yet we may have a shrewd suspicion. But this,
we are told, is "unscientific," for lack of a test." He continues, "Can
we afford to reject this very clear finding of common sense? Of course
great caution must be exercised in not pushing the matter too far.
Since the evidence is vague, we must not go farther than a very clear
mandate from common sense allows."
This, I think, is the
crux of the issue. When I walk home from class, sometimes I feel like
grabbing a cup of coffee from Espresso Royale. I can't remember exactly
what it costs me for a medium cup of coffee, but however much it is, it
wildly eclipses the amount it would cost me to make a cup at home. We
have a pretty good coffee maker here, and we grind our own beans. I
love coffee, and can definitely tell the difference between good coffee
and bad coffee, but I honestly don't think there's a difference in
quality between what I can make at home and what I can buy at the
coffee shop. The difference is really that I have to wait; I have to
walk all the way home and wait for the darn stuff to brew. I also have
to grind the beans, put water in the machine, and find my own cup. But
to be honest, the difference is pretty negligible; I'm honestly not
sure it's even rational for me to ever buy coffee from the shop, and
usually I don't.
Then again, sometimes I do. The dollar or two
difference buys me a small amount of convenience and instant
gratification. But imagine if every time I was going to buy coffee from
Espresso Royale, I stopped myself and put the money in an envelope and
sent it to help desperately poor people in Africa. For a few dollars,
you can buy quite a bit over there, even after those altruistic leeches
in the non-profit agencies skim off their "administrative costs." In
many countries, people live off of that much money per day. Someone who
might have starved would be fed; someone who might have suffered
horribly from an easily curable illness would be given the medicine
they need.
Quick, tell me which will result in a greater
increase in utility: (a) I get my cup of coffee at Espresso Royale
instead of making it at home; (b) A child in Sierra Leone doesn't die
from tetanus because she is given a vaccine paid for by me. To preempt
the inevitable objections: let me reiterate, I am not saying anything
about whether or not I should get the coffee. I am only appealing to
the notion that it would be pretty ridiculous of me to say that I can't
determine whether (a) or (b) results in more utility gained, because
there's no scientific way to compare them. As Amartya Sen famously
said, "Why must we reject being vaguely right in favor of being
precisely wrong?"
That being said, I want to return to something
important that I quoted Harrod as saying earlier: "Of course great
caution must be exercised in not pushing the matter too far. Since the
evidence is vague, we must not go farther than a very clear mandate
from common sense allows." It is key to keep in mind that when we make
interpersonal comparisons of utility, we are not
measuring utility in a cardinal manner for each individual and
comparing these measurements to each other. We can not coherently say
that vaccinating the child in Sierra Leone produces 50 more utils than
me getting my Espresso Royale coffee. We cannot even say that the
vaccination produces 10 times more utility than I gain from my coffee.
At least not with any hope of accuracy, we can't. Given this inability
to precisely compare utility between individuals, it should be clear
that while we might justifiably engage in interpersonal comparisons in
extreme situations, we must be very careful when we approach the
margins.
Hopefully that's enough to establish my point of view. As always, feedback is welcome and appreciated.